PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS-TOWARD A THEORY OF ENTERPRISE LIABILITY UNDER "FORESEEABLE AND INSURABLE LAWS": I1*
ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIGt IN my earlier Article, "Guest Statutes in the Conflict of Laws,"' I attempted to show that the "place of wrong" rule offered by the Restatement of Conflicts for all types of torts, having been developed to protect the defendant against "punishment" under a law other than that of the place of his conduct, 2 is quite inappropriate as a device for solving choice of law problems involving what I have called enterprise liabilities for negligence without fault, and that one of these liabilities, the motorist's liability to his guest, should be subject to the "reasonably foreseeable and insurable" law. The present Article will examine the applicability of this principle in the growing field of products liability.
The development of the liability of manufacturers and other suppliers has often been described as the very model of the growth of a common-law institution. 3 Notwithstanding the many and often painful stages of this development, the final result has been surprisingly uniform throughout the United States, and indeed in common-law jurisdictions generally. But there have remained a few important differences among the several jurisdictions, particularly with regard to the structure and scope of the strict liabilities for breach of warranty 4 and the negligence liabilities under the so-called MacPherson rule, 5 both generally 6 and in cases involving food and drink. 7 In view of the great practical importance and interstate impact of these problems, one might expect a considerable body of conflicts law. But not-vithstanding much gratuitous judicial language, there is almost no such law, and the problem will be one of novel impression in most jurisdictions. Thus, no other topic in the conflicts law of torts lends itself more readily to the formulation of a rational *The second of three Articles by the author. The first appears in the present volume at page 595. The third will appear in the May issue.
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1. 69 YALE L.J. 595 (1960 S. 988 (1956) , where a possibly less stringent liability rule under the law of Nebraska, the place of harm, was neutralized by a lex fori favoring plaintiff concerning the burden of proof. See also 228 F.2d at 850 n.4 (conflicts discussion "perhaps ... academic!').
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court of the United States, in one of the very few cases in which it had occasion to discuss products liability, announced, in erroneous sole reliance on the nonconflicts case of MacPherson, the conflicts rule that "commonly" "a person acting outside the state may be held responsible according to the law of the state for injurious consequences within it." Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253, 259 (1933) . In MacPherson the domestic supplier rather than the foreign manufacturer was the defendant.
12. Only rarely will courts refrain from referring to the "rule' and base their decisions on a lex fori coinciding with all pertinent foreign laws. The tortured constructions and doctrinary convulsions to which courts are driven by their lipservice to the Restatement may be illustrated by two by-nomeans-isolated cases. In Rhode Island a manufacturer is liable to third parties for his defective products within the scope of the now almost universally accepted MacPherson rule. But a Rhode Island suit by the Mississippi user of a defective Rhode Island product was dismissed by the federal district court "reluctantly" following the "harsh rule" of ississippi,2 4 which had refused to accept the MacPherson doctrine. The court felt compelled to do so because Mississippi was the "place of wrong." Historically at least, the primary, if not exclusive, rationale of this reference is, to use a phrase of Justice Holmes, that it is unjust for the forum to treat a defendant "according to its own notions rather than those of the place where he did the acts."'1 It would have been difficult in the present case for the defendant to assert that he had observed a different standard of conduct or a different practice in pricing or insurance as to sales in Mississippi. No wonder that in order to do justice in the face of such hopelessly inadequate doctrine, judge Magruder reversed the district court decision. But, adhering to the Restatement rule, he had to take refuge in a reconstruction of Mississippi law in the plaintiff's favor. In another case, a Missouri plaintiff had been injured in an Indiana air crash, presumably caused by a defect of the airplane which had been manufactured and inadequately repaired in Kansas. Neither the court nor the parties were willing to investigate the clearly irrelevant law of Indiana and acquiesced in the application of the law of Kansas, the lex fori. But in order to do so, the court had to announce its own peculiar understanding of the Restatement's place-of-wrong rule as designating the place "where the airplane was manufactured and repaired, rather than ... where the accident occurred." 1 This, then, is the "certainty" of the Restatcnicnt rule to which courts have been urged to sacrifice application of their own law.
Fortunately, among the thirty-odd cases purporting to apply the place-of- While there can be little quarrel with the result of these tvo cases, their dogmatic reasoning could fatally confuse the nascent conflicts law of products liability. To take two extreme situations: An Ohio citizen, on a trip to New York, consumes, and falls ill from, contaminated food produced and sold by an Ohio manufacturer in violation of the Ohio statute. Under the Restatement "rule," apparently sanctioned by the courts in the two above mentioned cases, he would not be able to recover under the Ohio statute because the harm occurred in New York. Or an Italian citizen, on a trip through Ohio, consumes, and falls ill from, contaminated food produced and sold to him in Italy. Under the Restatement "rule" he could recover from the Italian manufacturer under Ohio law in any state in which he could obtain jurisdiction. The basis for distinguishing these situations from those properly subjected to the law of the place of harm must be found in the rationale of products liability itself.
In Cir. 1959 ), lack of a modern rationale led to decision for defendant distributor in a suit by a seriously injured user of a ladder which broke when first extended. The court reasoned that defendant was not "obliged to test this ladder for structural strength," any more than "the operator of every retail store in the villages which dot the Kansas prairies." Id. at 498. That may be so. But, in contrast to the village retailer and the consumer, a national chain store -is obligated and able to insure against losses caused by its operations. become the prevailing rationale of products liability and thus properly usable as the basis of conflicts law: the supplier's broadening liability to both his buyer and third parties is both bearable and needed primarily because it serves the distribution of objectively, and usually subjectively, unavoidable loss and is, therefore, calculable in the process of pricing and insuring.
2 2 For intrastate purposes, the basis of such calculation is, of course, the supplier's own law. Where, however, distribution in sister states as well as abroad is contemplated or at least foreseeable, the possible impact of laws prevailing in the states or countries of such distribution must and can be taken into accounLt. No reason is apparent why in such cases the manufacturer should be given the benefit of a more lenient law. (1958) . Conceivably, an American manufacturer relying on the lenient liability laws of his own state may seek to limit distribution of his product to that state. If such a scheme were devised bona fide, as for example to make possible hazardous but socially desirable experiments, and if sufficient precautions were taken to warn out-of-state users, there could be situations in which application of a foreign law of liability would be inappropriate under the test here proposed. A similar situation could arise with regard to extranational products of a foreign manufacturer subjected to transient jurisdiction in this country. But such situations would be rare. Since the foreign manufacturer can generally be subject to the jurisdiction of a court in this country only if he is doing business here, problem cases would be limited to those where he has expressly excluded distribution in this country of a particular product. Current products liability insurance -policies are usually limited to accidents within the United States, its territories and possessions and Canada. Arnold In general, plaintiff will be able to obtain application of the most favorable law by choosing his forum in the expectation that the court will, in accordance with the basic rule, 24 apply its own law. This rule alone may ultimately suffice once the judicial and legislative reform of our law of jurisdiction has, on the one hand, put at the plaintiff's disposal all "convenient fora" including that of his residence and, on the other hand, protected the defendant against being "caught" in an inconvenient forum. 25 But until the conclusion of this development, the forum may have to choose relevant foreign laws over its own. For the protection of the plaintiff, Walter Wheeler Cook in 1942 suggested that the plaintiff be given the choice of the law most favorable to him. 2 " Limited to foreseeable and thus "insurable" laws, this postulate is, in effect, operative today, in keeping with the growing tendency of American courts to protect the consumer. In all cases in which the conflicts question was pertinent, the decision was for the plaintiff. Some support for the suggested test might be derived from the leading case of 1-hunter v. Derby Foods, Inc., 110 F.2d 970, 972 (2d Cir. 1940) , where the court stressed the fact that defendant had "sent food into Ohio .... ." The -same factor appears in the peculiar analogies referred to by the court: "that of shooting a firearm across the state line,... "After all, the defendant did act for his own purposes, and his act caused the damage; if the domestic rule of one of the states would impose liability if all had happened there, why not allow the recovery ?" Cook did not see this postulate endangered by certain older decisions of the United States Supreme Court which were based on obsolete "notions about the necessary territorial limitations upon 'law.'" Id. at 40 n.75.
27. Cases in which the plaintiff lost, when analyzed, reveal either that no conflict was present, or that the court was advised of no conflict, or viewed the conflicts question as irrelevant. See Mannsz v. Macwhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445 (3d Cir. 1946) (recovery denied under law of Pennsylvania, state of forum and harm; no law more favorable to plaintiff mentioned) ; Brooks v. Hill-Shaw Co., 117 F2d 682, 685 (7th Cir. 1941 62, 80 N.E.2d 334 (1948) , a negligence suit against a perfume manufacturer was dismissed under the law of Maryland, the state of the plaintiff's place of injury. But the narrow interpretation of the MacPherson. rule in New York, the forum and presumably state of manufacture, would apparently have led to the same result. See PRossEa, TOUTS 500 & nn. 31, 37 (2d ed. 1955) . Cases barring the suit under the forum or foreign statute of limitations are not pertinent. E.g., Maryland v. Eis Automotive Corp., 145 F. Supp. 444 (D. Conn. 1956); McGrath v. Helena Rubenstein, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 822 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) . Nor are decisions concerning jurisdiction. E.g., Openbrier v. General Mills, Inc,, 340 Pa. 167, 16 A.2d 379 (1940) . [Vol. 69:794 To be sure, this rule might occasionally enable the plaintiff to recover against a foreign supplier under the latter's law where he would fail to recover against a domestic defendant. But this concededly undesirable result merely reflects the equally undesirable, but unavoidable, fact that any scheme for the distribution of losses caused by nationwide mass distribution is, and will probably continue to be, based on the supplier's rather than on the consumer's calculation. While the latter cannot be realistically expected to arrange his program of insurance and consumption to accord with the liability laws of each state whose products he may consume, the producer can be expected to calculate his losses under the laws of each state in which his products may be distributed, and thus to carry the burden of the most unfavorable law among those reasonably foreseeable and insurable.
The defendant, under our present law of jurisdiction, must be permitted, however, to object to the application of a'nonforeseeable and thus uninsurable law in a "transient" forum. The most important limitation on the Ie.c fori in this respect is one analogous to that discussed in my earlier Article on "Guest Statutes in the Conflict of Laws.1 2 8 The guest boarding an automobile in the state where it is permanently kept may eoxpect only as much protection as is given to him by the law of that state, and if that law contains a so-called guest statute limiting his host's liability to wilful negligence, this liability is all the guest should be allowed to count on wherever he may be injured. It seems unreasonable to compel the host, as we do now, to buy insurance against a liability that he might incur under the law of a state possibly to be reached on a yet unplanned out-of-state trip. On the other hand, the guest can be expected to be familiar with the guest statute of his host's state and to carry his own accident insurance without regard to more favorable laws prevailing in his own state or in states he might touch on his trip. This situation is of course absent in the typical products liability case. The average consumer cannot realistically be expected to carry the accident or health insurance he needs even under the products liability laws of his home state. On the other hand, insurance for liabilities incurred under the consumer's law can reasonably be carried by the manufacturer who expects distribution of his product in the consumer's state.
This conclusion may be different where the buyer is an entrepreneur himself, as for instance, a builder or department chain store who purchases materials from manufacturers or wholesalers all over the country. Such a buyer may himself be expected to foresee and calculate the incidents of his operations. 29 To be sure, in such cases the most appropriate allocation of the burden to insure will often be doubtful, and, owing to our present highly uncertain conflicts law, insurance practice lacks a reasonable pattern. have imposed liabilities based on such an allocation, however arbitrary, insurance practice will follow. 80 Wihether the manufacturer or another supplier be held liable, whether the forum adhere to a fault concept of products liability or to a limitation of this liability to the immediate purchaser, and whether it favor the wider distribution of risks and losses in any or all respects, any court should accept the application of proper laws typically calculable in the particular enterprise. In this sense enterprise liability will, in the conflicts context, also, "extend to all casualties and hazards that are injected into society by the activity of the enterprise, at least to the extent that they are reasonably foreseeable." 3 ' In the absence of conclusive rulings on the subject, it seems permissible, and indeed imperative, to formulate postulates which can now be adopted by the courts without abandonment of accepted terminology, and which respond to economic and social needs as well as to sound theory. 8 2 In summarizing these postulates, a distinction must be drawn according to whether the parties in the particular case have the benefit of a modern law of jurisdiction or must adjust their needs to the catch-as-catch-can (transient) rule still prevailing to some extent in some states, under which the forum may well lack the desirable contact-based competency. 33 First, the le.r fori applies prima facie, in accordance with the basic rule of tort conflicts law and the practical exigencies of products liability in particular.
Second, the modern law of personal jurisdiction now permits in some states, and will no doubt soon permit more generally, suit in virtually any state that has at least one of a growing number of contacts with the case. Among those, in addition to the defendant's domicile, the "place of wrong" will usually be included. It is likely that further progress will lead to the treatment of plaintiffs residence as the place of wrong for the purpose of creating a proper forum.3 Under this system, the plaintiff would usually be able to choose from among several courts that with the most favorable law. Whether the parties' unequal economic status in the typical products liability case will induce the courts to relieve the plaintiff of the burden of a foreign law suit by permitting him to claim a more favorable foreign law even at the place of his own residence remains to be seen.
In any event, in those cases in which defendant, owing to peculiar conditions of his business, 35 will feel justly aggrieved at having his liability treated under a noninsurable lex fon the doctrine of forum non conveniens will have to supply the necessary corrective. 36 Once the state of the plaintiff's residence has become more widely available to the latter, the defendant will probably more generally be permitted to resort to this doctrine to prevent suit in a then largely unnecessary transient forum. In the federal courts transfer of such cases to the more convenient forum should not be permitted to preclude application of the more proper lex fori of the transferee court. Finally, choice of law will remain generally necessary in those states in which, in the absence of a machinery assuring a contact-based jurisdiction, the plaintiff or the defendant may still be forced into an improper forum and thus subjected to an "improper" lex for. In such cases the plaintiff must be permitted to claim applicability of any "proper" law-usually that of the defendant's place of business or of the plaintiff's residence. The defendant, on the other hand, must be permitted to object to the application of any lex Jori which is not reasonably foreseeable and insurable. 38. The law of a transient forum as such is probably not a foreseeable law in this sense. Thus a supplier operating in a state with a lenient liability law should probably be entitled to rely in his calculations on the incidence of losses occurring in states with similar lenient laws notwithstanding the possibility that plaintiffs from these states might sue in third states by obtaining transient jurisdiction.
